A cross-sectional mixed methods study protocol to generate learning from patient safety incidents reported from general practice by Carson-Stevens, Andrew et al.
A cross-sectional mixed methods study
protocol to generate learning from
patient safety incidents reported from
general practice
Andrew Carson-Stevens,1,2,3,4 Peter Hibbert,3,5 Anthony Avery,6 Amy Butlin,1
Ben Carter,1 Alison Cooper,1 Huw Prosser Evans,1 Russell Gibson,1 Donna Luff,7,8
Meredith Makeham,3 Paul McEnhill,1 Sukhmeet S Panesar,4 Gareth Parry,8,9
Philippa Rees,1 Emma Shiels,1 Aziz Sheikh,4,8,10 Hope Olivia Ward,1
Huw Williams,1 Fiona Wood,1 Liam Donaldson,11 Adrian Edwards1
To cite: Carson-Stevens A,
Hibbert P, Avery A, et al.
A cross-sectional mixed
methods study protocol to
generate learning from
patient safety incidents
reported from general
practice. BMJ Open 2015;5:
e009079. doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2015-009079
▸ Prepublication history and
additional material is
available. To view please visit
the journal (http://dx.doi.org/
10.1136/bmjopen-2015-
009079).
Received 15 June 2015
Revised 28 August 2015
Accepted 9 September 2015
For numbered affiliations see
end of article.
Correspondence to
Professor Andrew Carson-
Stevens; carson-stevensap@
cardiff.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Introduction: Incident reports contain descriptions of
errors and harms that occurred during clinical care
delivery. Few observational studies have characterised
incidents from general practice, and none of these have
been from the England and Wales National Reporting
and Learning System. This study aims to describe
incidents reported from a general practice care setting.
Methods and analysis: A general practice patient
safety incident classification will be developed to
characterise patient safety incidents. A weighted-
random sample of 12 500 incidents describing no
harm, low harm and moderate harm of patients, and all
incidents describing severe harm and death of patients
will be classified. Insights from exploratory descriptive
statistics and thematic analysis will be combined to
identify priority areas for future interventions.
Ethics and dissemination: The need for ethical
approval was waivered by the Aneurin Bevan University
Health Board research risk review committee given the
anonymised nature of data (ABHB R&D Ref number:
SA/410/13). The authors will submit the results of the
study to relevant journals and undertake national and
international oral presentations to researchers,
clinicians and policymakers.
INTRODUCTION
Primary care poses unique challenges for the
design of better quality systems of care deliv-
ery.1–3 To date, the focus on patient safety
research has largely been within hospital set-
tings and given the different case-mix consid-
erations and the approach to care provision
between hospitals and general practice the
ability to transfer lessons to primary care has
been limited.1 Despite 90% of healthcare
interactions with healthcare professionals
occurring in primary care settings in the UK,
little is known about the possible risks to
patients and their impact on patient
health.1 3 Systematic reviews of the primary
care patient safety literature highlight a
paucity of empirical work that explores the
relationship between cause (error) and
effect (harm), and the underlying system
failures.1 4
Established methods for examining health-
care safety, for example case note review,
root cause analysis or incident reporting,
provide different and incomplete observa-
tions of the underlying problems. Incident
reporting systems have previously been used
to identify priority areas and generate recom-
mendations to improve care quality and
safety at a local and national level.5–8 In
2003, a major investment was made in the
National Reporting and Learning System
(NRLS) to better understand incidents
occurring in England and Wales. Each hos-
pital and healthcare facility has a reporting
system that collects paper or e-incident
forms. Since 2004, NHS organisations in
England and Wales have uploaded their inci-
dents to the NRLS central database. Around
100 000 incidents a month are uploaded,
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Incident reporting systems can be limited by the
quality of data, particularly under-reporting,
selective-reporting, incomplete-reporting and
incident non-detection.
▪ Insights from exploratory descriptive statistics
and thematic analysis will be combined to iden-
tify priority areas for future intervention.
▪ Our findings will be inductive and hypothesis
generating.
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making it the most comprehensive system in the world.
The NRLS has informed multiple learning outputs
including Rapid Response Reports, Patient Safety Alerts,
and Safer Practice Notices.9 Despite these initiatives,
incident reporting systems have gained little respect
from the health information and research communi-
ties.7 10 Incident reporting is underutilised in general
practice which currently contributes to less than 1% of
reports.9
The NRLS contains information about incidents with
‘free-text’ descriptions of the events, perceived contrib-
uting factors, and plans to minimise risk of reoccur-
rence. Over 40 000 reports from general practice in
England and Wales have been submitted to the NRLS in
the past decade, and these have never previously been
systematically analysed. Such incidents permit a retro-
spective ‘window’ on the healthcare system, providing an
opportunity for directing improvement initiatives by
identifying weaknesses in the system that are leading to
errors and harms occurring during clinical care deliv-
ery.11 Large-scale incident analysis is an under-exploited
area within primary care patient safety, and should serve
to demonstrate the value of safety monitoring, and
emphasise the beneﬁts of an effective reporting system
for healthcare professionals, managers, leaders and
patients in the NHS.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
We will undertake a mixed-methods study to characterise
the nature and range of incidents reported from general
practice in England and Wales, in order to:
1. Develop a classiﬁcation using empirical evidence
from reports.
2. Describe the relative frequency of different types of
incidents.
3. Describe incident characteristics such as patient age,
geography and level of patient harm.
4. Determine which characteristics are associated with
different degrees of patient harm.
5. Map relationships between themes, as well as categor-
ies of incidents and potential contributory factors,
and elicit possible areas with opportunity for
intervention.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
Data source
The deﬁnition of a patient safety incident in the NRLS
is “any unintended or unexpected incident that resulted
in or could have resulted in harm to one or more
patients receiving state funded care”.9 Reporting inci-
dents that resulted in severe harm or death of a patient
became mandatory in June 2010; however, before this all
reporting was voluntary, and remains so for incidents
resulting in no, low or moderate harm.
Healthcare professionals have a duty to report inci-
dents to healthcare organisations’ incident management
systems. These are anonymised and uploaded to the
NRLS. Each report contains categorical information
about location, patient demographics and reporter per-
ception of severity of harm–collected in a structured
report form–as well as free-text descriptions of the inci-
dent, potential contributory factors and planned actions
to prevent re-occurrence. The free text description,
where the reporter is asked to describe what happened
and why they think it happened, offers a rich body of
qualitative data for identiﬁcation of areas for improve-
ment. These descriptions offer insight into the harms
occurring or detected by healthcare professionals
working in general practice from their perspective.
For more detail about the NRLS, Donaldson et al12
have described it in detail, including its current manage-
ment in England and Wales.
Study design
We will undertake a cross-sectional mixed methods study
of reports that includes a thematic analysis informed by
an exploratory data analysis.13 14
Study setting
Incident reports will be received from 571 different loca-
tions such as Health Boards (formerly Local Health
Boards) in Wales and Clinical Commissioning Groups
(formerly Primary Care Trusts) in England.
Sample selection
Incidents received by NRLS between April 2005 and
September 2013 from general practice will be consid-
ered as the complete data set (n=42 729 reports).
Given the inductive and exploratory nature of the
study, we will analyse all incidents resulting in severe
harm or death in the data set and a random sample of
12 500 non-fatal reports. To ensure results in our sample
are current, a weighting will be applied to the random
sample so that recent reports (2012-onward) are more
prioritised than reports from previous years (2005–2009;
2010–2011), as well as increasing proportions from no
harm, low harm and moderate harm, respectively.
Following removal of all reports with a level of harm of
severe and death, approximately 15%, 30% and 60% of
each stratum will be drawn using a simple random
sample without replacement. The probability of drawing
a report is twice as likely in group 2 compared to group
1 (least recent and increasing proportions by level of
harm from no harm to moderate harm), and four times
more likely in group 3 (most recent and increasing pro-
portions by level of harm from no harm to moderate
harm) compared to group 1; this results in a data set
with 12 500 reports see table 1.
Classification system and reviewer training
The analysis of safety incident reports has largely been
organised and managed by safety classiﬁcation
systems.15–31 Several patient safety classiﬁcations were
reviewed and considered for inclusion,4 32–35 including
those developed for general practice.34 36–40 These
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classiﬁcation systems provided considerable guidance for
shaping the scope of the system needed. To chronologic-
ally model the sequence of events culminating and con-
tributing to an incident as per the classiﬁcation rules of
the Recursive Model of Incident Analysis (see ﬁgure 1
and see online supplementary appendix 1),41 a more
granular framework is required. Therefore, we will
empirically develop our own classiﬁcation system to
undertake a detailed description of incidents, including
those that are complex in nature involving a sequence
of events contributing to and culminating in the inci-
dent. The classiﬁcation system will incorporate multiple
coding frameworks. Based on the WHO International
Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety (WHO ICPS), four inde-
pendent classes to describe the incident, its contributory
factors and type of, and level of harm, will be developed
using an iterative approach to create the Primary Care
Patient Safety (PISA) Classiﬁcation System.42
A multidisciplinary team of clinicians will be recruited
as incident reviewers. They will receive training in inci-
dent analysis, classiﬁcation, root cause analysis and
human factors in healthcare and undergo simulation
with a practice data set. During the training period, to
focus reviewers on the relevant content of interest, they
will be required to identify in each incident the criteria
outlined in ﬁgure 2. These criteria were developed by
content analysis of 500 randomly sampled incidents by
ACS and HOW. Early stages of familiarisation with the
data by reading the reports and use of a priori codes
from pilot work, will guide the iteration of the frame-
works (discussed in more detail later).43 The reviewers’
interpretations will be informed by tacit knowledge, clin-
ical expertise and the human factors training received to
guide ‘sensemaking’, deﬁned as “the active process
of assigning meaning to ambiguous data”, in order to
identify the learning that can be used to inform
improvements in clinical care.44 45 Once >70% agree-
ment (κ statistic) between reviewers and an experienced
coder (HW) is achieved, the reviewers will be able to
code the study data.
Coding management system
To ensure our process is replicable for healthcare orga-
nisations to consider adopting our classiﬁcation system,
we have decided not to use an existing qualitative data
analysis management software tool. In addition, given
the distributed and international nature of the project
(UK, USA and Australia), we have developed a bespoke
solution to support the iteration of frameworks and
provide secure access to numerous concurrent reviewers
regardless of geographical location. This classiﬁcation
system will be made publicly available. The system is
comprised of a backend database system and a web-
based portal. The backend database has been built on
Microsoft SQL Server 2014, with custom SQL algorithms
to provide, for example, live concordance checks
between reviewers’ double coding. The web front end
was produced using a customised version of Portoﬁno
4.1.1, an open source web framework written in Java.
Data analysis
There are three stages of work planned:
▸ Stage 1: Familiarisation and data coding—which involves
reading the free-text of the report and applying
codes to describe incident type, potential contribu-
tory factors, level and type of harm.
▸ Stage 2: Generation of data summaries—using descriptive
statistical analysis.
Table 1 Study sample described by report period and level of harm
Reporting period Group Group size, N
Level of Harm
TotalNone Low Moderate
April 2005–2009 1 18 039 2162 846 631 3639
2010–2011 2 12 660 2237 894 770 3901
2012–September 2013 3 11 198 2292 1721 947 4960
6691 3461 2348 12 500
Figure 1 Example of codes
from the Primary Care Patient
Safety (PISA) Classification
System using the Recursive
Model for Incident Analysis.
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▸ Stage 3: Interpretation of themes and learning—seeking to
understand the most commonly identiﬁed patient
safety themes, events leading up to it and reported
contributory factors, and the contexts within which
they occurred.
Each stage will now be considered in more detail.
Stage 1: Familiarisation and data coding
Reviewers will orientate themselves to the content by
reading the incident report, which comprises several cat-
egorical variables and three categories of free-text data.
Next, they will apply codes to each incident from the
four classes—incident type, contributory factors, and
type and degree of harm.
Coding large data sets requires effective teamwork in
order to utilise the tacit knowledge and experience of
multiple coders.46 To ensure validity and reliability of
coding throughout the study, regular inter-coder reliability
checks will be undertaken on a 20% random sample of
each reviewer’s coding quota for every 250 reports
coded.47 κ statistics will be calculated for each principal
incident type, deﬁned as the incident that occurred just
before the harm or potential harm. A κ of >0.7 is sought
at checkpoints between reviewers for reports randomly
identiﬁed for double-coding purposes; this is consistent
with previous studies of a similar nature.4 Should the κ
statistic fall below 0.7, both coders will meet (probably
fortnightly) to discuss discrepancies and a re-test score will
be calculated once both parties believe any issues of
potential concern have been resolved. Where discrepan-
cies cannot be resolved by discussion between reviewers,
third person arbitration will be sought from a senior inves-
tigator (ACS/AE).47 It is envisaged all reviewers will code
approximately equal shares of the total number of reports.
The codes within each class will be inductively
amended throughout the process. Ideally, a codebook (a
collection of coding classes) should be ‘all-inclusive’ with
codes with deﬁnitions that are ‘mutually exclusive’.48
Where an existing code is not available to describe the
incident characteristics, the study team will discuss at
weekly coding meetings whether a new code is needed,
or whether the deﬁnition of an existing code should be
amended to be more inclusive. The study team is com-
prised of doctors, nurses, mixed methods researchers
and patient safety experts. These meetings will also be
used to discuss inter-coder agreement, and will attempt
to resolve any issues that relate to understanding and
application of speciﬁc codes.
Hypotheses that emerge from each step of analysis will
be noted by reviewers during coding and analysis via
electronic memos and discussed at weekly coding meet-
ings. As codes are assigned, for example, ‘wrong dose
administered’ and ‘wrong drug administered’, the code-
book will be developed, and we anticipate the study
team will begin to observe how cases cluster around par-
ticular codes or sets of related codes, and thematic
groups will emerge, for example, ‘administration errors’,
which will inform the development of each class.49 In
addition, insights identiﬁed from review of descriptions
of ‘planned actions to prevent future occurrences’, or
any ‘protecting factors’ identiﬁed from the free-text
description of the incident (eg, a parent or carer advo-
cating on behalf of a patient and mitigating a more
severe outcome), will be recorded in the memos and
will also be used to inform discussions about recommen-
dations for practice improvement.
Stage 2: Generation of descriptive summaries
We will describe and summarise the data, in order for it
to inform subsequent hypothesis formation. The analysis
will aim to describe the most commonly occurring inci-
dent types and codes, contributory factors and incident
outcomes. Moreover, the analysis will explore high-level
associations among these features. We will exclude reports
Figure 2 Checklist of questions
for coding orientation.
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that contain insufﬁcient detail or do not describe a
patient safety incident from these descriptive summaries.
The nature of our inquiry is inductive and guided by
clinical expertise. Therefore, Exploratory Data Analysis
(EDA) techniques will be applied, to produce for
example, frequency tables, cross-tabulations, and bar
charts, ready for interpretation and reﬁnement through
expert clinical guidance.50 As the purpose of our study is
to generate learning to support healthcare professionals
to improve the safety of care delivery, we recognise it is
essential that the outcomes of the EDA are accessible
and can provide a logical account of how we have identi-
ﬁed the priority issues for possible intervention.
Frequency charts will enable us to identify the most
common and most harmful reported incident types.
Cross-tabulations between data variables (eg, age group,
incident type, contributory factor, and incident out-
comes), and between incident codes and contributory
factor codes, will help to identify priorities (eg, vaccine
errors in children) and clusters of common reported
contributory events or factors for further inquiry by the-
matic analysis (Stage 3). We will explore whether the
mandatory requirement for reporting incidents that
result in severe harm or death since June 2010 has inﬂu-
enced reporting practices.
Stage 3: Interpretation of themes and learning
The purpose of our proposed thematic analysis13 is to
deepen the analysis and interpretation gained in Stage 1
(description of characteristics of incidents) and Stage 2
(identifying patterns or recurring themes in the data) to
identify and prioritise the most important patient safety
problems, and characterise and interpret them to enable
recommendation for improvements in practice (Stage 3).13
This is an EDA which collates relevant codes
into themes and subthemes that describe the most
common and most harmful reported safety incidents.
Re-examination of these incidents in clusters of themes
will provide opportunity to identify any contextual issues
within each subset of data (eg, all reports describing mod-
erate harms or worse following issues accessing clinical ser-
vices for urgent assessment). The subsets of reports will be
re-read by two clinicians (ACS and HW) and any iterations
to the relevant themes or subthemes, as well as their deﬁ-
nitions, will be discussed with the study team.
DISCUSSION
This will be the largest analysis of general practice
patient safety incident reports undertaken. Leading
experts recognise that despite limitations of reporting
systems (underreporting, incomplete view of incident,
and reporting biases) they provide multiple perspectives
over time and form an integral part of routine monitor-
ing in clinical practice.11 We will identify priority issues
for improving the safety of healthcare delivery in
general practice, and inform the development of a
range of interventions and approaches to improve
patient safety in this setting. By identifying priority issues
and the key concepts for informing future improvement
efforts, we anticipate our study will also provide momen-
tum for promoting a reporting culture in general prac-
tice. Our ﬁndings will be hypothesis generating,
inductive in nature, and require development and
testing through future research and improvement efforts
in clinical practice.
We will summarise our ﬁndings for dissemination to
National Health Service organisations, and expect to make
recommendations to enhance the future reporting and
analysis of general practice incidents. Dissemination via
presentations at national and international conferences
and peer-reviewed journals is planned. We believe our ﬁnd-
ings could be relevant to patient advocacy organisations
and special interest groups. We intend to organise training
workshops with key stakeholders such as general practice
registrars (those in their ﬁnal year of training) and their
trainers (those responsible for their supervision).
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